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  1 
‘”The Germans are Hydrophobes”’: Germany and the Germans in the Shaping of 
French Identity in the Age of the French Revolution’.1 
 
Historians of national identity in Europe have frequently distinguished between ‘western’ 
and ‘eastern’ patterns of belonging.  In the ‘western’ form, the nation is defined 
politically, that is as a matter of explicit or implicit political choice by its individual 
citizens whose continued existence together as a nation, as Ernest Renan famously 
declared in 1882, was a tacit ‘daily plebiscite’.2  This makes one’s nationality, at least 
theoretically, a matter of political choice, defined by one’s determination to share the 
political and civil rights of citizenship with other citizens in the same state.  It might take 
years or even a generation before some individuals or groups, such as foreigners and 
immigrant communities, are allowed to enjoy the full rights of citizenship, but their 
ethnicity, racial origins or religion are not an obstacle to that process.  Indeed, in some 
cases, their new nationality is meant to transcend, if not efface altogether, such identities. 
The ‘eastern’ form of national identity is one which glories in the shared ethnic 
roots and distinct culture of a people, who, it is claimed, enjoy a common descent from a 
particular ancestry, real or mythical.  One remained ‘organically’ part of one’s nation, 
whatever one did and wherever one went.  Ties of ‘blood’ and ‘culture’ are often evoked 
to justify or to explain this immutable sense of belonging.  In this definition, foreigners 
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who cannot claim to share the same ethnicity or ‘race’ can never be full citizens.  Based 
on these two different conceptions of national identity, ‘nationalism’ can therefore take, 
respectively, two different forms: ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’.3 
‘Nationalism’ itself can be defined variously.4  For the purposes of this chapter, 
nationalism is here defined as a belief that the individual is part of a people called a 
‘nation’ which is bound together in ways which transcend social and, sometimes, 
religious and ethnic differences.  In nationalism, the nation is held to be an essential 
source of individual identity.  The nation owes no loyalty to any institution beyond itself: 
it is the source of sovereignty and legitimacy.
5
  Nationalism can therefore be the 
expression of a programme of national unity or liberation, or conversely, of territorial 
conquest and domination, based on a nebulous sense of entitlement or superiority.  What 
‘nationalists’ of all kinds have in common is that they assume that the nation exists 
objectively, but that some sort of activity is required to ensure that the nation is 
recognized and that its rights are fulfilled.  This might mean dramatic actions such as an 
insurrection to expel foreign rulers, or conquering other peoples to ‘restore’ or ‘reunite’ 
territories claimed as integral to the nation.  It might equally entail the development of a 
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programme of education or other cultural initiatives to awaken a dormant, provincial 
population to their true identity as part of a wider, national community.  It follows that 
nationalism is based on a sense of national identity (even if, at the outset, it is shared only 
by a rarified bunch of intellectuals) and seeks to galvanize, instill, or even create that 
sense of identity amongst that wider population which is said to be the nation.  Ironically, 
while nationalists generally claim that the nation has ‘always’ existed (even if awareness 
of that existence remained subterranean), in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
most European nationalists were confronted by the awkward fact that most of the very 
people who belonged to the ‘nation’ were in fact entrenched in older loyalties – regional, 
dynastic, religious.  It was for this reason that Massimo d’Azeglio famously declared just 
after Italian unification that ‘we have made Italy.  Now we must make the Italians’.6  It 
was one thing to create the political framework of a unified state, but quite another to 
mould the people with their older, divergent loyalties into citizens bound to the abstract 
idea of the Italian nation. 
The French revolutionaries of the 1790s were faced with precisely the same task 
when they swept away – on paper at least - the corporate, municipal and provincial 
privileges which, prior to 1789, had defined one part of France from the other and one 
social group from the next.  All French people were henceforth meant to be, firstly and 
foremost, citizens of the national community, defined by the enjoyment of the rights of 
man proclaimed repeatedly by the revolutionaries over the course of the decade.  
Religion, culture or ‘race’ were not preconditions for French citizenship in any of the 
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constitutions of the 1790s, but, for a foreigner seeking naturalization, living on the 
nation’s territory and taking the civic oath were. 
The modern French Republic, therefore, with its emphasis on this revolutionary 
heritage, is usually held to be representative of ‘civic’ nationalism, while Germany is 
usually considered as a classic example of ‘ethnic’ nationalism, where once the Volk did 
not simply mean ‘people’, but carried strong connotations of blood and culture.7  Yet 
recent work has suggested that the distinction between the ‘civic’ and the ‘ethnic’ is a 
false dichotomy and that all forms of European national identity and nationalism carry 
elements of both.  Anne-Marie Thiesse emphasizes the common eighteenth-century 
origins of national identities in Europe.  In a metaphor which will strike a chord with 
anyone who has been exposed to the dubious pleasures of ‘do-it-yourself’ furniture, she 
refers to the European variations on the same essential themes as ‘the IKEA system’, 
which, ‘from the same basic categories, allows for differences in assembly’.8  Anthony D. 
Smith distinguishes between ethnic and civic identities for the sake of analysis, but 
stresses that ethnic and civic elements are ‘the profound dualism at the heart of every 
nationalism’.9  Most recently, the editors and authors of a rich and dense volume of 
essays on the subject agree that ‘the dichotomy between civic and ethnic forms of 
nationalism corresponds, at most, to an ideal type.  In most cases, it fails to describe the 
diversity and contradictoriness … of nationalism in modern Europe’.10  Not all historians 
accept, however, that French republican nationalism was cut from the same cloth as other 
European nationalisms.  David A. Bell, for example, argues strongly that what 
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distinguished the French type was not only the single-minded purpose with which since 
the Revolution representatives of the French state (mostly notably republican school 
teachers) pursued the goal of turning provincials into ‘Frenchmen’, but also the genuine 
universalism in French nationalism, which sought not only to build the nation, but also to 
expand it so that it embraced as much of humanity as possible.
11
   
These differences of opinion raise important questions about the evolution of 
French national identity and nationalism.  In the first place, as French power surged 
across Europe over the course of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, French 
soldiers and officials came across non-French peoples whom they struggled to understand 
or accommodate.  If the rights of man were universal, it seemed that they were, in fact, 
buried beneath deep seams of cultural difference.  Put another way, the universalist 
aspirations of the French Revolution were heavily blunted once they made contact with 
the ‘other’.  In the Holy Roman Empire, the variety of local customs and practices – and 
the obvious attachment to them which persisted amongst many Germans - bemused and 
frustrated the French as they sought to export revolutionary ideals and institutions.  
Cultural difference was a still more urgent issue in those areas like Belgium, Piedmont 
and the Rhineland, which were directly annexed by the Republic.  When these regions 
officially became part of France, the challenge of turning their peoples into French 
citizens seriously tested the revolutionaries’ universalist ideas, since they constantly 
struck against a wall of much older loyalties, social relations and customs.  As Stuart 
Woolf has shown, the ‘universalism’ of French revolutionary notions of nationhood was 
predicated on the assumption of the superiority of French civilization, judged in terms of 
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manners (moeurs), politeness (civilité) and laws (police – which also means organisation, 
administration).
12
  Mike Broers has further proposed that the French exercised a ‘cultural 
imperialism’ or indeed an ‘orientalism’ within Europe, predicated on this sense of having 
the blueprint for a state arranged along lines citizenship exercised within a rational, 
ordered and centralized state.
13
          
The cultural process by which these French ideas of citizenship, nationhood and 
civilization developed did not start with the Revolution, but began, as David Bell has 
shown, at the beginning of the eighteenth century when, in opposition literature the 
‘nation’ rather than the king started to be regarded as the source of legitimacy, 
particularly amongst the Jansenists.
14
  Moreover, in what Peter Sahlins terms the 
‘citizenship revolution’, from the 1760s the monarchy itself sought to make clearer 
distinctions between nationals and foreigners, while writers began to explore concepts of 
the active citizen participating in the public sphere.
15
  Liah Greenfeld argues that the 
development of French nationalism in the eighteenth century was spurred by a sense of 
ressentiment towards France’s great rival, Britain.  This term did not only mean 
‘resentment’, but also a more complex knot of envy for, reaction to and imitation of 
British mores and institutions, driven by a patriotic sense that France could and ought to 
do better.
16
  David Bell, too, charts the evolution of French nationalism with reference to 
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French perceptions of the British, particularly during the Seven Years War and its 
aftermath.
17
   
While recognizing the central importance of the Franco-British rivalry to the 
development of nationalisms and national identity on both sides of the Channel,
18
 this 
present chapter suggests that French perceptions of Germany and the Germans also 
played an important role in shaping the French self-image.  Additionally, in one 
important sense French relations with the Germans had a greater impact in molding 
French notions of citizenship and civilization because the French were never presented 
with a genuine opportunity of annexing any part of British Isles.  Yet they did, of course, 
annex the Rhineland and, under Napoleon, a broad swathe of territory as far as the 
Hanseatic cities.  Consequently, Germany in general offered an example of the ‘other’ 
against which French civilization was judged, while the Rhineland in particular became 
one of the testing grounds for the universal application of revolutionary citizenship. 
 
 
Germany and the Germans as the ‘other’ 
 
Germany, or rather the states of the Holy Roman Empire, provided a rich though very 
fragmented mirror in which progressive Frenchmen and women could find a reflection of 
France’s own virtues, vices and, ultimately, superiority.  This process, of course, went 
back a very long way – at least to Froissart – and in, a more intense and consistent way 
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from the seventeenth century.
19
  One should also add that an important source of French 
images of Germans came not from across the Rhine, but from within the boundaries of 
the French kingdom – in Alsace, which first fell to the French in 1648.  In the later 1790s, 
one of the Directory’s commissioners in Mainz warned the government that although 
Alsace had been united to France for a century, ‘the same prejudices and the same ills’ 
still afflicted the province, thanks to the over-indulgence shown by the conquerors.
20
  
From his perspective, the stubbornly persistent ‘Germanness’ of Alsace was still too 
evident and provided a salutary warning to the French about accommodating local 
customs in the Rhineland.
21
   
One of the earliest eighteenth-century French observers to commit pen to paper on 
Germany proper was none other than Montesquieu, who travelled through southern and 
western Germany in 1729.  This was not the Montesquieu of the Lettres Persanes, which 
used the device of sophisticated foreigners staring in satirical wonder at French customs 
and institutions.  Instead, Montesquieu’s Voyage en Allemagne reflect the author’s own, 
private perceptions (since they were not published until the nineteenth century), but they 
certainly reflect wider French prejudices.  Germans are phlegmatic, have no sense of 
irony and have an excessive penchant for wine and beer while avoiding water – for this 
reason, Montesquieu flatly states that the Germans ‘are hydrophobes’.  A traveller 
passing through a village asking for water would provoke a gathering of the entire 
populace who would watch as the stranger drank and laugh uproariously.  Having made 
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this judgment on German dipsomania, however, Montesquieu then fell seriously ill … 
from having imbibed the local water.
22
  Montesquieu also relates – again, without any 
flourish - some odd Germanic customs.  In Heidelberg, for instance, he visits the 
famously giant wine vat in the cellars of the castle.  One may drink from it, but if one 
fails to observe certain rituals, including toasting the health of the Elector, or if one 
strikes the barrel, one would be soundly spanked on the backside.
23
 
Montesquieu’s political observations are more serious: Prussia (this, of course, 
decades before the accession of Frederick II) is intolerably frugal, boorish, despotic and 
militarist.  The Duke of Württemberg is capricious and frivolous, while in Bavaria the 
local magistrates ‘live like princes and are little tyrants’.24  The fragmented nature of the 
German polity, even with the overarching structure of the Holy Roman Empire, elicited 
less-than-enthusiastic French commentary: the Encyclopédie wrote that ‘one conceives 
that this form of government, establishing within the same empire an infinity of different 
frontiers, assumes the existence of different laws from one place to the next, money of 
different types and goods belonging to different masters’.25  In Candide, Voltaire 
famously ridiculed the tinpot nature of the small German states, the obsession with noble 
pedigree and the unwieldy language.
26
  
Decades before the Revolution, therefore, French commentators were remarking 
on the odd German political and social jumble.  Yet there were also nuances.  Progressive 
French publicists lionised Frederick the Great because of his enlightened reforms, his 
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military prowess (visited, not least, against the French themselves during the Seven Years 
War), his famous preference for the French language over German and, perhaps above 
all, the consistently anti-Austrian orientation of his foreign policy.  Respect for 
Frederick’s legacy persisted into the 1790s.  At the end of 1791, as the National 
Assembly debated the prospect of war against Austria, Frederick, now dead for five 
years, was described (not inaccurately) as a ‘philosopher king’ whose state was rich, just 
and stable.
27
 
With the eruption of the Revolutionary Wars, the revolutionaries cast themselves 
in the role of liberators because of the strong sense that their principles of liberty and 
equality were universal.  It was not long before France itself was identified with 
‘civilization’ and, later its self-proclaimed mission would be applied not only to Europe, 
but to the wider world as the ‘civilising mission’, which became a central justification for 
French overseas imperialism.
28
  In the 1790s, any people who did not match up to the 
exacting standards of the Revolution would fall beneath France and the French in the 
hierarchy of moral and political development. 
This was well-expressed when the revolutionaries cast a glance over what, to their 
eyes, were the unacceptably arcane structures of the Holy Roman Empire.  When making 
his case to the Directory for the annexation of the Rhineland in January 1796, the 
stridently republican Jean François Reubell grudgingly admitted that the French would 
still have to treat with the German princes.  The sort of overarching structure provided by 
the Empire had its uses in that it provided unity and protection to Europe’s soft centre, 
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‘however vicious [the Empire] is in its political principles, in the bizarreness and 
incoherence of its elements’.  But, Reubell continues: 
 
If the war which we have waged had yielded more generous successes, we could 
have disdainfully refused to have treated with the Princes and have thought only 
of Nations, those great families of the human species.  But since circumstances 
have not allowed us to purify our system to that stage, let us still do something for 
the Princes, until such time as the slow workings of reason, more terrible than 
Victories, hurls them from their trembling thrones and calls the subjects, whom 
they keep curbed beneath a shameful yoke, to participate in the rights which we 
have conquered and so leaving around us only people driven by the same 
principles and who are, consequently, friends.
29
 
 
The rhetorical implications of Reubell’s analysis are striking: the princes and Germany’s 
imperial structures may have been an international necessity, but the language left 
Reubell’s fellow Directors in little doubt that France was still to regard these Germanic 
survivals as offensive to the whole idea of an international order based on national rather 
than dynastic sovereignty.  On the other hand, once the Germans had understood their 
rights and claimed them, there was no doubt that friendship between the two peoples 
would logically follow.  That time, however, seemed long distant.  Meanwhile, the 
implication is, there could be no true friendship between peoples who could not greet 
each other as equals – and in this context, ‘equality’ meant adopting republican forms of 
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government and citizenship.  French perceptions of the differing levels of enlightenment 
imposed limits on the cosmopolitanism implicit in the priniciples of the Revolution – and 
‘cosmopolitanism’ meant the spread of liberté à la française, not a pluralist vision of 
different expressions of nationhood.  The French could work towards the ‘regeneration’ 
of the peoples of the soon-to-be-annexed Rhineland, who were meant to be turned into 
fully-fledged citizens of the Republic, but the high tide of civilization would clearly stop 
on the left bank of the Rhine. 
This was some contrast from the very early days of the war in 1792, when French 
revolutionaries looked for, and found, evidence that while the old regime authorities 
might have been benighted, the population was not.  Religion – or rather the levels of 
religiosity displayed – played an important role in French assessments of the levels of 
German enlightenment.  In May 1792 the secretary of the French legation to Prussia, 
Louis Marc Rivalz, wrote to the then foreign minister Dumouriez, at the end of his 
outward journey across Germany to Berlin.  He was damning about Catholic attitudes, 
but not those of the Protestants.  ‘I can assure you that the Spanish, whose morals and 
opinions I have studied with some care, have resisted the influence of the Roman clergy 
more than the Germans have.’  He argued, none the less, that among the Protestants he 
met, there was more enthusiasm for the French Revolution.  Among them, Rivalz 
reported that when he handed out a tricolour ribbon, it was immediately cut up into small 
pieces so that everyone could have a piece of the French red-white-blue.
30
 
Despite the scowling of the Reubells of the Revolution, even as the initial 
optimism of being greeted as liberators rapidly evaporated, the nuances in French 
perceptions of the Germans proved to be surprisingly persistent.  French superiority in 
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civilization was never doubted – at least, not by revolutionary and Napoleonic officials – 
but observations about the Germans were not entirely negative and in some cases they 
were quite the opposite.  Even on the eve of their crushing defeat of the Prussians at Jena-
Auerstadt in 1806, the French regarded the military ethos of the Prussian state with a 
mixture of derision and admiration.  A sense emerges from the French diplomatic 
correspondence from Berlin that the Prussian army was not as good as the French, but 
was better than the Russians and the Austrians.  Moreover, it was argued, the good thing 
about the Prussians was that they loathed the Austrians and the Prussian army would 
march to war against them with a spring in their step.  To satisfy their sense of honour, 
however, the Prussians would fight the French because they, of course, were the most 
worthy of adversaries.
31
  Interestingly, while French diplomats remarked on the state of 
the Prussian army and spoke with a certain awe of Frederick the Great’s military 
legacy,
32
 they revealed no sense that France, too, was a militarized state – by the later 
1790s perhaps the most militarized state in Europe.  If one may speculate, this apparent 
blindness may have stemmed from a deep sense that French national values and identity 
were always rooted in the civil and political rights of citizenship – even, in theory if not 
fact, under Napoleon. 
As a conglomerate of different lands, the Grand Duchy of Berg, created by 
Napoleon on the right bank of the Rhine in 1806 out of the Duchies of Cleves and Berg, 
ceded respetively by Prussia and Bavaria,
33
 offers a picture of the nuances in microcosm.  
On the formerly Prussian territories, a report of March 1806 informed Napoleon, some 
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institutions were good enough to be kept, some could be transplanted from one part of the 
Grand Duchy to another, while others had to be swept away altogether.  Among the 
useful institutions which were even worth emulating elsewhere were the fire insurance 
company, which was cheap enough to be accessible to almost anyone, and the regime in 
the prisons, which ensured the humane treatment of the inmates, while also imposing on 
them useful tasks which instilled the work ethnic amongst criminals.
34
  Yet there was less 
to be said for the formerly Bavarian areas of the new state.  In the same month, Marshal 
Murat, who was the first Grand Duke, thundered to Napoleon of the administration that 
‘it is a chaos which is giving me a great deal of trouble to disentangle.  There has never 
been an organisation less regular than that which exists here. …. There was a royal 
regency council, a ducal regency council, a privy council, a commission … no one has 
fixed responsibilities … I cannot find anyone who is completely familiar with any single 
branch of the civil service’.35 
The differences across the Grand Duchy were still apparent in 1809, which was a 
very difficult year for the French in Germany.  A report on the public mood in March 
declared that morale was generally good in the formerly Prussian areas, where the 
government had been enlightened.  The County of ‘Lamarck’36 was a small province 
which had ‘profited from all the good laws of Frederick II’.  Yet even here, there were 
problems, for a Gordian knot of administrative and fiscal offices had been deliberately 
maintained to prevent the Prussian state from raising taxation.  Needless to say, the local 
population now had cause to regret to arrival of ‘a government which is too close and too 
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clairvoyant’.  The former bishopric Münster,37 meanwhile, was a ‘patrie des Candides’, 
where the population was divided between a twelfth-century nobility and a mass of 
peasants who are ‘enserfed and brutalised’.  Like the German gentry ridiculed by 
Voltaire, these nobles were obsessed with their status, particularly their honours and 
titles, but, the report continues, ‘the regeneration of the country has begun with the 
decrees which suppress serfdom and feudal inheritance … it has changed slaves into men.  
The brutishness of these slaves is such that they do not feel its benefits yet, but measures 
are being taken to hasten their education.  Now there is a mass of people who have been 
rescued.’  This comment was, of course, a little optimistic, not least because all peasants 
had to pay compensation to their lords for the abolition of seigneurialism.  Since the costs 
were prohibitive for many peasants, the system remained unaltered in many parts of the 
Grand Duchy.  The report concludes with a remark on state-building à la française: 
 
… but it will surely require time and effort to create a patrie from these people 
gathered up from ten or twelve different jurisdictions and amongst whom, unlike 
on the other bank of the Rhine, there has occurred no revolution, which is a 
terrible, but very rapid, method of education for a people.
38
 
 
The overwhelming sense of all this is that the Germans would require an enormous 
dedication of time and effort before they could be cultivated to the levels of civilisation 
represented by the French Revolution.  France had earned the right to lead the process 
precisely because it had had a revolution.  It was regenerated.   
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Germans into Frenchmen: the Rhineland 
 
If the Germans were so different from the French, how could they be shaped into citizens, 
as they had to do when, from 1798, the French began to process of annexing the 
Rhineland?
39
  In the 1790s, the obvious answer for the revolutionaries was an ideological 
one: the question was answered by the universalist implications of the rights of man.  
From the French perspective, the full enjoyment of these rights could only occur within a 
French republican framework, but sincere loyalty to that Republic and active engagement 
in citizenship were – in revolutionary theory - the essential determinants of nationality.  
Initially, when annexation seemed very likely to go ahead, the French commissioners in 
the conquered territories of the Rhineland in the spring of 1798 spoke of their 
gratification over the apparent enthusiasm with which the Rhenish peoples petitioned for 
annexation.
40
  Some officials even claimed that the Rhineland, like France, had had its 
own revolution, even if it was nipped in the bud by the Prussian resurgence in 1793-4.  In 
a carefully-scripted festival held in March 1798, an official was to declare that ‘the 
people of these territories had courageously thrown off the yoke of its tyrants, who 
coalesced in order to retake that sovereignty which had just been reconquered’.   All of 
this suggested that the Rhinelanders did, indeed, have the political will to the part of the 
French Republic and that they, unlike much of the rest of Germany, had awoken to their 
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rights.  None the less, it was made amply clear that the ultimate thanks were owed to 
France, ‘the great nation [which] through its power ended that cruel struggle’.41  
Significantly, this festival was held in Mainz, which could claim, at least, to have had a 
hard core of revolutionaries during the first French occupation of 1792-3 and who, while 
they may have been a minority, at least represented a cross-section of urban society.  
Yet French optimism in 1798 proved to be very shortlived, for it soon became 
obvious that there were more hindrances than assistance to the integration of the 
Rhineland into the Republic.  Speaking in republican terms, it seemed clear to the 
Directory’s commissioner in the Rhineland, François Rudler, that the Rhenish were not 
yet ready for the plenitude of French political liberties.  In March 1798, Rudler and his 
friend the justice minister, Lambrechts, had an interesting exchange of letters regarding 
the introduction of the French constitution of the Year III (1795) into the four Rhenish 
departments.  The commissioner was clearly grappling with his conscience: 
 
Should the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the Citizen, founded 
on a morality which ought to be universal and which ought to bind the great 
human family together in all times and it all places, and which cannot be 
tampered with when one is a French citizen, should it suffer modifications, or 
exceptions?
42
 
 
For Rudler, articles 17 and 20 of the Declaration struck him as especially problematic for 
the Rhineland.  The first of these declared that ‘Sovereignty resides essentially in the 
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universality of citizens’, while the second proclaimed that ‘each citizen has the equal 
right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the formation of the law, in the nomination of 
the representatives of the people and of public officials’.43   Rudler, in other words, was 
not yet ready to recognize his Rhenish administrés as part of the sovereign French nation.  
Yet if the rights of man were immutable and universal, then how could one deny the 
Rhinelanders their political liberties when, by the very fact of annexation, the Republic 
was claiming them as citizens?  Lambrechts’ reply twelve days later is revealing.  There 
should, he said, be no modification to the Declaration: 
 
The truths which are proclaimed there are eternal truths, independent of 
circumstance and place.  The rights and duties of man are the same at 
Constantinople as they are at Paris.  But if those rights are imprescriptible, the 
course of events can indefinitely suspend their application.  They have often sold 
by corruption, they have often been forgotten by ignorance and fanaticism.  
Sometimes, finally, the laws of war, which make one people dependent on 
another, deprive it momentarily of the exercise of its sovereignty.  The inhabitants 
of the left bank of the Rhine are in this last category.  But the Republic is great 
enough to allow these people to know the full extent of their rights, as it is strong 
enough to maintain the practical measures which circumstances impose and which 
are necessary for its own conservation.
44
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The practical application of Lambrechts’ reply is perhaps not surprising in that, as one 
might expect, the occupiers were reluctant to open up any legal channels through which 
concerted opposition might be expressed.  Yet it is also clear that Lambrechts and Rudler 
were unwilling to admit even to each other, in closed correspondence, that the rights of 
man did not necessarily apply to the Rhineland. Significantly, Rudler was from Alsace 
and Lambrechts was from Belgium: both men, in other words, were from the 
geographical and cultural peripheries of the French Republic.  Both probably understood 
more than most that the revolutionary state not only had to undertake the administrative 
integration of the periphery through the imposition of uniform structures, but that it also 
had to encourage the cultural absorption of the peoples of the periphery.  The doctrine of 
the rights of man, by transcending language, customs and other sources of ethnic identity, 
had the potential to integrate diverse peoples into one polity – once it was no longer 
deemed risky to give the peoples of the periphery the freedom to express themselves.  Yet 
in the 1790s, that moment seemed long distant.  The correspondence of the 
representatives of the French power on the ground is replete with remarks about the 
nostalgia for the old regime, the persistence of religiosity and – tellingly – language as a 
barrier to the forging of the Rhenish peoples into French citizens.
45
  Although it was 
never explicitly whispered, there was an implicit recognition that, for all the 
cosmopolitanism implicit in the revolutionary ideal of citizenship, the universality of the 
rights of man was buried beneath weighty layers of cultural difference and the persistence 
of older social relations.  In practice, the Rhinelanders would not be granted full 
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constitutional government until the Consulate of Napoleon Bonaparte, by which time the 
idea of active citizenship was all but an empty concept.  To Napoleon, there was no need 
to shape the Rhenish into politically engaged citizens, since the role of all French subjects 
– a term which officially supplanted the word ‘citizen’ in 1806 – was primarily to obey, 
not participate in politics.   
Yet the revolutionaries persisted in the belief that the Rhenish could be forged 
into citizens.  One suspects that the French ultimately hoped to assimilate – that is, 
following Mike Broers and the theorist Nathan Wachtel,
46
 to obliterate the indigenous 
culture and impose the imperial one in its place.  In pondering how to do so, some 
republicans came up with some radical solutions which dwelt on the issues of language 
and cultural identity.  In February 1799 the naturalist and antiquarian Casimir Rostan, 
who had been sent by the interior minister, François de Neufchâteu, to gather information 
about the left bank of the Rhine, suggested the colonization of the Rhineland by French 
people from the interior, so that there would be cultural mixing in which, gradually, the 
Rhenish people would lose their original identity and melt into the mass of French 
people.
47
  A ‘Citizen’ Berger, who was in Mainz in the late 1790s, declared that there 
could be no indulgence of local languages among the republic’s officials: 
 
If the French language is to be the nursing mother of its pupils, must propagate its 
work and make itself understood wherever a man decorated with the tricolour 
ribbon applies and executes the law.  You want to open a temple of reason, but 
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only Frenchmen should carry the flame there…The Frenchman is rebutted once 
he pronounces one word, since it is true that the administrators sustain that 
antipathy amongst his family, at the shopkeeper’s and rebounds visibly against the 
French.  Encourage the propagation of the French language: you can do it, you 
want to do it, and the interest of the republic demands it.  
 
Echoing Rostan’s idea of colonies, Berger suggested that republicans be encouraged to 
settle in all corners of the Republic.  Encouraging French people to settle in Mainz and 
according administrative and judicial posts to Frenchmen would nourish the spread of the 
French language in the region.  Without that, future generations of Mainzers would 
simply inherit the prejudices of the old regime.
48
  None of these propsals were taken 
seriously at the time, but it shows that, for all the emphasis on citizenship as the 
determinant of nationality, in reality some of the revolutionaries believed that cultural 
uniformity was necessary.  Under pressure the revolutionary proponents of ‘civic’ 
nationalism could adopt tenets more usually associated with the ‘ethnic’ kind. 
Yet the reality on the ground proved to be very different – the Rhineland was 
never fully assimilated into the French imperium, but was rather integrated into it – that 
is, again following Broers and Wachtel, French institutions were imposed, but then the 
local population adapted them, which allowed for older mentalities, loyalties and cultural 
and social ties to remain intact, or at the very most mutated.  The Rhineland was 
strategically too important and local society too vigorous for the French to risk alienating 
those whose co-operation or quiescence was needed.  Lambrechts told Rudler at the start 
of his mission that he was not to strike indiscriminately at all customs, for fear of 
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alienating the population.
49
  The republican festivals held in 1797 were bilingual.
50
  
While initially Rudler hoped that he could use only fully-paid-up Rhenish republicans to 
administer the French conquests, later officials, especially under Napoleon, recognized 
the importance of local knowledge and a grasp of the local dialect more than ideological 
conformity, as well as the importance of having the respect and trust of the population, 
even if this meant recruiting officials and jurists who had served the Old Regime.
51
 
This meant, in effect, that the French used intermediaries: local people who could 
to some extent mediate between the demands of the revolutionary or Napoleonic state 
and the local population.  In some cases – as in Cologne and Dormagen – these 
intermediaries mounted a robust and, for a time, successful defence of local institutions 
against the leveling impulses of the French.  This was a situation which the government 
in Paris found hard to swallow:   
 
… it is evident that the unity which is so necessary in the administrative order and 
in any well-established political system, demands the reform of the government of 
Cologne. … It would be contradictory to establish our republican regime in all the 
other parts of that region, while only the city of Cologne keeps a form of 
Government entirely opposed to our own.
52
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In fact, as Michael Rowe has shown, Rhenish officials, including those of Cologne, were 
not counter-revolutionaries, but, under pressure from both sides, were trying hard to steer 
a middle course between the French and their exiled German rulers.
53
  Throughout the 
‘French period’, the Rhinelanders proved to be not the passive subjects of the Napoleonic 
state, but rather they took what they wanted from the French – not least the Napoleonic 
Code – while working to mitigate the impact of other aspects of French rule.54   
 
For the French revolutionaries, it was clear that while the Germans were, by and large, a 
frustratingly complex people whose loyalties remained rooted in the past, there was still 
some good raw material with which officials could work as they reordered central 
Europe.  If one admitted that, then it also meant that one could potentially go a step 
further and suggest that Germany had never been as benighted as some French policy 
makers suggested.  Germany therefore could be used – in a positive sense - as a means of 
chastising French action in Europe.  In 1810, Germaine de Staël did just that when she 
tried to publish one of her greatest works, De l’Allemagne, which had a clear polemical 
objective in attacking Napoleon’s policies.  Before 1806, she writes: 
 
Germany was an aristocratic federation; this empire had no common centre of 
enlightenment and public spirit; it did not form a compact nation, and the binding 
was missing from the bundle.  This division of Germany, though fatal to its 
political strength was none the less very favourable to efforts of all kinds which 
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might have tempted genius and imagination.  There was a kind of gentle and 
peaceable anarchy, in terms of literary and metaphysical opinions, which allowed 
each man to develop completely his own individual way of seeing things. 
 
Staël is far from gushing over Germany and the character of its peoples.  Rather, she 
highlights the contradictions and the tensions within German culture.  For example, the 
Germans can be fiercely individualist in their philosophy, but docilely obedient to their 
government, while feudalism persisted in the midst of enlightenment.
55
  Staël had 
personal reasons to express nostalgia the Holy Roman Empire: from Switzerland, she was 
well aware that a confederation of states provided an alternative to the heavily centralized 
model which, for French nationalists, was the apogee of rational administration.
56
  In 
addition to her innate ability to get under Napoleon’s skin, Staël also ran into trouble with 
the censors because she tried to present Germany in a more positive light, rather than 
through the critical lens of Napoleonic conceptions of civilization.  Savary, the Minister 
of Police, chased Germaine into exile, explaining in a letter dated 3 October 1810 that her 
work on Germany showed that ‘the air of this country does not suit you, and we are not 
yet reduced to the point where we need to find models amongst the peoples whom you 
admire’.57  With de Staël, Germany was entering into the rhetoric of opposition to 
Napoleonic rule: there were alternative forms of civilization to that imposed by the 
French Revolution. 
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The final unraveling of Napoleonic Europe left French imperialists with some 
explaining to do: if the standards of civilization achieved by the French Revolution were 
so superior, then why then did it collapse so spectacularly between 1813 and 1814?  After 
1815, diehard French republicans and Bonapartist conspirators might have grumbled that 
the Revolution still offered the best model for the workings of the rights of man, and, 
more prosaically, for a rational administration, but it was uncomfortably clear that they 
had been defeated militarily by a coalition of states stubbornly opposed to the French 
Revolution.  Amongst these awkward facts was that the two great German powers were 
central to the defeat of Napoleon and, even more awkwardly, in the process the Germans 
had shown that they could be motivated and stirred by patriotism, a patriotism which 
wholeheartedly rejected French civilization.  Historians like Matthew Levinger have 
shown that such patriotism was rarely devoted to the wider cultural and political concept 
of ‘Germany’, but was more often focused on loyalty to one of the individual German 
states and its dynasty – Staatspatriotismus – or even more fundamentally, a particular 
region within a state - Landespatriotismus.
58
  These loyalties were powerful forces 
operating within the framework of the Old Regime.  From the contemporary point of 
view, therefore, the war in Germany showed that the capability of a state to mobilize its 
people in a national cause was neither a monopoly of the French and nor always going to 
rally behind the French Revolutionary version of liberty.  The hard realities of defeat 
showed the French that there were still alternative paths of development.  Even if these 
did not have to be followed, they still had to be treated with some respect.  Nineteenth-
century French nationalists might still cast France in the role of liberator and educator – 
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as they did in 1830 and 1848 – but the collapse of the French imperium in Germany 
marks the start of a process by which French nationalism began to recast its role in 
Europe.  No longer seeking to regenerate and integrate other Europeans in the French 
image, France would now lead a Europe of nationalities.  This would prove, of course, to 
be a myth, but it was one which, in exile on Saint Helena, the Ogre of Europe himself had 
begun to cultivate. 
 
In the years before the Revolution and in the initial flourish after 1789, the French idea of 
the nation was certainly shaped in relation to the wider world, particularly with the often 
painful exercise of making comparisons between the French and the British.  The 
Germans, too, played a role as the ‘other’ in defining French national identity.  Yet the 
main thrust in shaping the concept of the nation was political and internal, in the sense 
that in 1789 the sovereign nation was defined against the absolute monarchy and the 
privileged orders.  This still made, as David Bell has shown, an active proselytizing 
necessary among the French people to awaken them to their new rights and sovereignty 
as part of the ‘nation’.59  French revolutionary nationalism therefore involved a 
programme of political and cultural activity, aimed at forging a nation-state out of the 
various peoples of the French Republic.  The nationalism of the French Revolution was 
defined by these efforts at nation-building.  In trying to shape the population into citizens, 
whether within France or in the annexed territories, the revolutionaries came up against 
the harsh realities of other cultural and political identities: religious, linguistic, regional 
and dynastic.  In the Rhineland some republicans responded with solutions which made 
revolutionary nationalism sound very close to the ‘ethnic’ or ‘eastern’ type.  Indeed, 
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Rostan and Berger’s concerns for culture and language were echoes of the earlier, short-
lived attempt to impose linguistic uniformity on France itself in 1794.  Those efforts 
collapsed along with the Terror and while French administrators in the Rhineland under 
both the Republic and the Empire saw education in its various forms as an essential tool 
in shaping the locals into good citizens, they also recognized that German would remain 
the language of the majority of the Rhenish people for a very long time.  This was why 
festivals were held in two languages and bilingual officials, such as Rudler, were 
preferred by the government.  In France itself, patois were tacitly allowed to survive even 
under the Third Republic, provided they did not appear to threaten national unity.
60
  At 
the same time, the use of intermediaries in the relationship between the government and 
the local population helped to ensure – as the revolutionaries themselves were well aware 
– the survival of older loyalties and identities.  Much of the reluctance to enforce a 
programme of cultural uniformity was certainly a practical response to the logistical 
difficulties in imposing it.  Yet some of the revolutionaries, like Rudler and Lambrechts, 
appeared to take the universalist, ‘civic’ language of the French Revolution seriously.  
Pragmatism and idealism combined to ensure that the Revolution’s ‘civic’ nationalism 
survived even the challenges of cultural difference.  It ensured that even people who were 
regarded culturally as ‘others’ could be forged into citizens of the Republic, even if it 
would take time for them to attain the levels of civilization represented by the French 
Revolution.  The cultural assimilation or integration, which the revolutionaries 
undoubtedly saw as desirable, would take time, but meanwhile the essential facts of 
French belonging – the rights (and duties) of citizenship and the benefits of the legal and 
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administrative systems of the Republic – would still define people like the Rhinelanders 
as citizens. 
Yet that same universalism (the term used at the time was cosmopolitisme) ensured that 
French nationalism was also expansive: if political rights - and not culture - were the 
prime determinants of nationhood, then there were, potentially, no limits to the expansion 
of revolutionary France.  This sense of purpose, based as it was on a sense of superiority, 
was later called the mission civilisatrice, or civilizing mission, which justified French 
overseas imperialism in the nineteenth century.  Yet there was one important rupture 
between, on the one hand, French nationalism as an imperial ideology in Europe and, on 
the other, as visited upon the overseas empire of the nineteenth century.  As the French 
imperium in Germany shows, in Europe it was hoped that French laws and administration 
would eventually be as applicable among the conquered peoples as they were in France, 
but this universalist premise was not extended to the indigenous populations of the 
overseas empire.  While there were programmes for ‘assimilation’ and, after 1900, 
‘association’ (which accepted limits on complete assimilation and a slower pace of 
francisation, or ‘Frenchification’), in practice local peoples were legally ‘subjects’ and, 
as such, they did not bear anywhere near the same rights as citizens.
61
  This suggests that, 
in the nineteenth century, a racial dimension to French identity did emerge.  Yet in 
metropolitan France, nationalists continued to insist on the civic heritage bequeathed by 
the Revolution.
62
  This republican inheritance remained – and remains still - a weighty 
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‘site of memory’, which has ensured that in the post-colonial era it is the civic form of 
nationalism which informs mainstream French identity.  While this tradition has 
sometimes struggled to deal with the multicultural challenges of other identities (most 
notably in the recent hijab affair), it has also proved to be robust in the face of the bleaker 
forms of nationalism posed by the extreme right, which would define Frenchness in 
ethnic or racial terms.  
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